China-India Tawang faceoff not a surprise: What is different now?

China- India LAC faceoff near Yangtse in Tawang Sector on December 9th 2022 is neither the first nor the last one, but it is resulting in injuries to a few soldiers on both sides. It also shows increasing aggressiveness and violent attempt to enforce their own perception of LAC by both sides. Post Galwan clashes in 2020, the Indian side is not surprised by the irresponsible behaviour of the PLA, which had junked all old agreements for peace and tranquillity earlier; hence Indian troops resolutely and firmly contested PLA’s effort to close into LAC near Yangtse in Tawang Sector presumably to change status quo. Although both sides immediately disengaged from the area, and held a flag meeting between opposing local commanders in accordance with structured mechanisms to diffuse the situation, such repeated attempts in future are possible and will have to be responded to proactively, resolutely and firmly each time, as demonstrated now. 

What makes Border Issue between China- India Complex? 

People's Republic of China (PRC) refused to ratify the Simla Agreement of 1914, signed between British India and Tibet, initialled by a Chinese representative. The Indian stance on the Border generally follows Johnson Line (1865) in Ladakh and McMohan Line in the East. When Maharaja Hari Singh signed the instrument of accession Aksai Chin was part of it; hence it rightfully belongs to India. India should have compelled China to accept Shimla Agreement, before recognising Tibet as part of the PRC. There is therefore no mutually agreed border treaty between Independent India and PRC demarcating borders.

China selectively accepts and rejects treaties based on what suits its interests. For example, during the Doklam Crisis, it referred to an 1890 Treaty which seemed advantageous to it, despite the fact that the said treaty was superseded by many other treaties later. 

LAC and its Complex Management 

The LAC by definition indicates loosely demarcated areas under the actual control of  Chinese and Indian forces. Both countries have their own perception of LAC and in certain areas these perception overlap (like Tawang, Pangong Tso). As LAC is not demarcated, Chinese, with scant regard to international agreements and obligations, uses non-demarcation as an opportunity to pursue its ‘Strategy of Incremental Encroachment’ by laying fresh claims (Arunachal Pradesh) and following it up with troops buildup/infrastructure development till resisted and stops just short of conflict.

However, an opposing action/build-up by Indian Forces leads to a ‘faceoff/standoff” each time. To avoid accidental triggers both sides have been resorting to measures short of live firing to prevent the other side from violating its perception of LAC. This is increasingly getting converted into violent clashes.

Why the faceoff in Tawang is different?

The transgressions, patrol clashes, faceoffs and subsequent flag meetings to resolve it has been a common feature of both sides' attempts to dominate or enforce their own claim on their own perception of LAC and will continue to be so till the LAC is demarcated. The current faceoff in Tawang is somewhat different than the earlier ones for many reasons if seen in the current geo-political and strategic context as below:-

⦁    Xi Jinping may be attempting to stoke nationalistic fervour out of his aggressive nationalistic stance by playing the victim card to divert domestic discontent due to the Zero COVID policy, the downslide in the Chinese economy and other reasons. 
⦁    Aggressive stance in Ladakh and Taiwan and its Chinese doctored narrative suited Xi Jinping in consolidating his position as a strong leader to secure a third term; hence he would like to continue with it further.
⦁   Unhappy with India's status as the 'fastest growing economy', a faceoff in winter may activate political debate in democratic India, and the nation's government may be compelled to deploy more troops throughout winter in all sectors, thereby increasing the financial cost for it by LOC-isation of LAC. 
⦁    An attempt to test Indian response in Eastern borders after the country has committed a large number of troops in Ladakh and Kashmir.
⦁    The strategic and cultural relevance of Tawang is coming to the forefront as the time for nomination of the next Dalai Lama is approaching. Tawang monastery has been the seat of cultural power and the birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama. 
⦁    Yangtse area has a tough approach from the Indian side and in winter is relatively more isolated; hence Chinese could have thought of taking a chance with intrusion there.  
⦁    China enjoyed gross asymmetry in infrastructure development in its favour for too long and is not comfortable with the Indian effort to catch up in this regard; hence disruption in development activities along borders suits its design. 

What should India do?

With no de-escalation by the Chinese in sight, India is and will continue to be ready for all contingencies with similar deployment along LAC, in the coming months/years, including creating some more leverages, if the situation demands so. Indian aim should be not to concede to a Chinese attempt to redraw LAC, or LOC-isation of LAC further. Chinese will like to keep the border unsettled, till the time the political cost of not settling it, for CCP, China becomes higher than doing so.

A change in mindset is required, from being reactive to being proactive with additional intelligence, surveillance and offensive capability. These will help demonstrate the capacity to encroach into Chinese sensitive areas, in absence of which China has assumed no threat from India, and the freedom to encroach anywhere, at will. If the Chinese have passed the Border Defence Law, India too should pass some laws to facilitate emphatic border construction and extend schemes under the Border Infrastructure Management Authority (BIMA) as near as LAC as is practically feasible. 

Looking Beyond

India must continue capacity building in all domains, including the maritime domain, where Chinese vulnerable sea lines of communications can be threatened. Besides ongoing infrastructure development along borders, the scope of the Border Area Management Programme (BAMP) needs to be enhanced.

To respond to the Chinese plan of 'well-off villages' along LAC, it is recommended that India adds surface communication to its Vibrant Village Programmes along northern borders. It is also recommended that States/UT along LAC allot concessional land to security forces like regional SCOUTS, ITBP, SSB, and families who hail from these areas (on the son of soil concept), and who are ready to settle in these villages, according to India’s perceptions of LAC. This will improve inclusive growth, and integration, besides proof of our claims on the border, to ward off Chinese design of developing hundreds of new villages along LAC.

Strategic partnerships with like-minded democracies and collective naval posturing to create multifront situations for China are efforts which should continue. There is a need for an alternative supply chain, trade and technological ecosystem, independent of China for which some initial steps taken by Quad countries need to be pursued.

(Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.)